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Empirical evidence suggests that the European unemployment problem is some-
how connected with a capital shortage. The paper lntroduces a Keynesian
model to deal with this issue. In this model the rate of capacity utiliza-
tion plays a central role in two simultaneously operating mechanisms thus
exhibiting hysteresis: price-adjustment end capital accumulation. The im-
plications for employment and unemployment are discusaed, both for the long
run and the development over time. It is demonatrated that equilibrium un-
employment may be caused by negative aggregate demend shocks.2
Unemployment persistence and loss of productive capacity:
a Keynesian approach
1. Introduction
In the discussions on long-term unemployment in Europe the possibility
of a capital shortage has been mentioned regularly. The main idea is that
insufficient capital accumulation created a situation in which not enough
jobs are availeble for the existing working force. Quite often also the ex-
istence of a capital shortage is rejected and different arguments are
presented to substantiate this claim. For instance, Layard and Bean (1988)
argue that the number of workers per machine can be varied on any shift and
that the number of shifts can be varied too. Under these circumstances there
ca~i be no capital constraint. What then really matters are supply con-
straints originating in the labour market. In Layard and Nickell (1986),
Nickell (1987) and other publications by the same authors this argument is
elaborated. It is assumed that capital accumulation or decumulation has no
effect on (equilibrium) unemployment, because changes in productivity are
fully reflected in changes in real wages. In our view this argument may hold
in a structural sense. Otherwise, unemployment would steadily rise or decli-
ne, which is clearly unrealistic. Nevertheless, deviations from the trend
growth rate could have a lasting impact on unemployment if real wages are
rigid to some extent.
The consequences of a reduction in the capital stock on impact of ad-
verse demand and supply shocks deserve therefore proper attention. It should
be noted in this connection that the problem has been analysed in a neoclas-
sical setting (e.g. Bruno end Sachs, 1985; Van der Ploeg, 1987; Burda,
1988). In these studies reductions in the capital stock affect the demand
for labour just as adverse supply shocks do. Demand shocks have no impact on
employment unless they affect the real exchange rate for the case of en open
economy (cf. Burda, 1988; Van de Klundert, 1988) or unless they affect the
interest rate for a closed economy (crowdíng in). However, in a world
characterized by price sluggishness demand shocks may have a more direct ef-
fect on the supply-side capacity. Blanchard (1988) takes thia view into
accoiint, but gives no complete analysis. Nominal price inertia enters his
model, because agents base price expectations on past realizations of3
prices. Production and investment decisiona are still based on price sig-
nals. Therefore, once price expectations catch up with actual prices the
neoclassical model is again fully applicable.
In our model sluggish price adjustment is associated with uncertainty
about the outcome of the competitive process if the economy is hit by ag-
gregative shocks. Firms may then behave rationally by adjusting quantities.
In the short run this takes the form of a reduction in output on impact of
en adverse demand shock. As the recession proceeds there will be an increase
in company failures and some large firms may close plents, scrapping capital
and making workers redundant. Once this has happened, once a factory has
been demolished, it cannot suddenly begin production again if demand for its
product were to increase. Hysteresis connected with capital decumulation in-
duces a decline in employment. If there are aufficient substitution pos-
sibilities and if real wages are flexible enough full employment could of
coiirse be attained within a reasonable time span. However, a severe loss in
capacity entails a loss in productivity, which may not be matched by real
wage moderations. Following Blanchard (1988) there is an obvious loose end
in the argument that a capital shortage leads to high unemployment. We agree
that the argument is not complete. In addition something should be assumed
about labour market clearing. But even then it may be important to give a
proper analysis of the "physical capital story" (Blanchard and Summers,
198ó). We think our paper may shed some new light on this issue.
Turning to the stylized facts it could be maintained that during the
protracted recession of 1980-1982 demand-deficient unemployment developed
into equilibrium unemployment, especially in Europe. Capacity utilization
rates for those years reflect the impact of the recession. After a year of
rapid recovery in 1984 the rates of capacity utilization in manufacturing in
European countries returned to normal levels (GECD, 1988, Chart H). In this
respect the time series for Germany (Table 1) provides us with a thoroughly
illustrative example. It appears that after the recovery capacity utiliza-
tion in Germany on the average has stayed at the peak level of 1979. Empiri-
cal evidence suggests that potentisl output was adjusted downward to actual
output. (In i985-i987 the average rate of output growth in Germany was about
2x a year, whereas in 1976-1979 it was about 4x a year..) Part of the loss of
productive capacity may have taken place by excessive scrappage of idle
capacity, which is not reflected in the official statistics. Nevertheless,4
decreasing investment ratios are a well-documented and widely observed fact,
indicating the slowdown of capital growth in Europe.i)
Table 1 Rate of c~acity- utilisation in manufncY,uri-ng ~Germany)
1973 87.1 1q76 80.2 1979 84.7 1982 76.3 1985 84.3
1974 A2.5 1977 80.2 1980 82.4 1983 78.4 1986 84.7
'975 76.0 1978 81.2 1981 79.0 1984 80.6 1987 84.3
Source: OECD (1984) and recent issues of OECD Main Economic Indicators.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 confronts the neoclassical
model of imperfect competition, capital accumulation and unemployment per-
sistence with our Keynesian approach. In section 3 an analytical solution of
the dynamic system emerging out of the Keynesian model is presented. The
system has one zero root, reflecting hysteresis and two negative roots,
which stabilize the development over time. The long-run solutions give rise
to a number of interesting observations. The paper closes with conclusions
and suggestions for further research.
2. Capital accumulation and unemplovment persistence: two views
In the neoclassical model structural unemployment is explained as a
result of the controversy between employers and employees within an equi-
librium context; product markets clear as a result of flexible prices.
Therefore, structural or equilibrium unemployment is caused by push factors
such as union militancy, mismatch on labour markets, the wedge between real
consumers' and real producers' wages, etc. Actual unemployment may deviate
from equilibrium unemployment in the short run, because of nominal wage or
price inertia. Nominal inertie is then modelled in a complementary way by
assuming that price or wage expectations of economic agents may deviate tcm-
porarily from their actual values. In a recent and useful review of economic
theory behind the papers at the Chelwood Gate conferences on unemployment in
Europe Blanchard (1988) critizes what he calls the false dichotomy between
equilibrium and actual unemployment. The main reason for this is that the
neoclassical theory at least in Chelwood Gate Mark I(Economica, 1986) does5
not Cit the ectual experience in Europe in the 1980s. During that period
negative aggregate demand shocks induced an inerease in actual unemployment
followed by a rise in equilibrium unemployment.
According to Blanchard Chelwood Gate Mark II explores two channels
which may explain that high ectual unemployment induces a high level of
equilibr~um unemployment and which were already suggasted at the first
confer~~ncr?. 1'he first channel is cepital accumulation. A sustained period of
unc;mployment may lead to capital decumulation and therefore to an increased
equilibrium unemployment level. The second channel relates to different
aspects of hysteresis on the labour market, implying that the natural rate
of unemployment depends upon the actuel rate (e.g. Sachs, 198~).
In this paper we focus on the problem of capital accumulation in rela-
tion to the European unemployment problem. We agree with Blanchard's
critique on the dichotomy between actual and equilibrium unemployment.
However, where Blanchard analyses the role of capital accumulation within a
neoclassical model we depart from this view of the world. In our opinion the
ultimate consequence of the dichotomy critique should be that behaviour of
producers is modelled differently from the neoclassical paradigm. For in-
stance if firms are confronted with a lack of effective demand this should
influence their investments decisions or more generally it may even endanger
the very existence of the firm. Blanchard (1988) suggests that the introduc-
tiun of monopolistic competition into the neoclassical model takes care of
the demand problem. This is not the route we want to follow. Monopolistic
competition does not change the neoclassical model in an essential way. On
the contrary, the formal results are the same except for a multiplicative
fnctor determining the monopoly profit of the firm. The stories told sound
of course different because firms are engaged in active price setting,
whereas under perfect competition firms are price tekers. But here again the
difference is only superficial. Under perfect competition someone has to set
prices and the dynamic evolution to a atate of rest mirrors theories of im-
perfect competition as Arrow (1959) has pointed out long ago. Therefore
stories of price setting end mark-up rules belong to the realm of perturbed
economies whether or not competition is perfect or neatly imperfect as in
the case of monopolistic competition.
To cope with the issue of demands shocks and capital decumulation we
present a model which is more Keynesian in spirit. It is assumed that price6
adjustment is sluggish. The reasons for price intertia are not spelled out.
Small menu cost (e.g. Blanchard and Kiyotaki, 198ï; Ball and Romer, 1987)
may be a cause, but we would prefer microeconomic theories focussing on in-
formational aspects (e.g. Stiglitz, 1984; Van de Klundert and Peters. 1988).
In an economy-wide recession firms may increase sales by lowering the price
of output, but they may be highly uncertain whether this would entail a rise
in revenue as competitors may lower their prices too. Under these cir-
cumstances it could be rational for risk-averse firms to stick to the
prevailing price level.
To place our model in proper perspective it may be useful to compare
the results with those of the neoclassical model. For this reason we first
turn to the latter model.
The neoclassical model
As the model is rather well-known we may concentrate on the main
issues, which are relevant for a comparison with the Keynesian model. Let us
assume a Cobb-Douglas production function for convenience:
Y - EL~K1-a (1)
where Y is output, L is lebour and K is capital. Under monopolistic competi-
tion firms face a downward sloping demand curve with elasticity r~((-1),
which is usually assumed constant.2) Profit maximization by the representa-
tive firm gives then the short-run demand for labour as:
L - ~1 a Y
R W (Z)
where W stands for the real wage rate. Substitution of (1) in (2) yields ttie
implicit expression for the price firms charge given the nominal wage rate
and the capital stock:
1-~
W-~~`E [L, (3)7
In the terminology of Layard and Nickell (198~) equation (3) gives the war-
ranted real wage, i.e. the real wage rate implied by price setting of firms.
On the supply side of the labour market unions may maximize their
utility by trading off employment for real wages (e.g. Oswald, 1985; Sachs,
198~). The target real wage resulting from a monopoly union model could then
be written as:
v
N W - ~ LLsJ
(4)
where Ns denotes the labour force, which is set equal to one for convenience
in the subsequent analysis. A chenge in the push factors mentioned above is
reflected in a change in the paremeter 4. Equation (4) is referred to by
Saclis (198~) as the wage-offer curve.3)
The equilibrium ( un)employment rate may be found by combining eque-
tions (3) and (4):
1
L (n~l ae K1-a 1tv-a
- L n 4
(5)
The equilibrium rate of unemployment reconciles the income claims of workers
and firms. Wage claims which are too high lead to a reduction in the demand
for labour as the perhaps more familiar argument runs. An increase in push
factors lowers equilibrium employment through a rise in 4. Capital decumula-
tion leads also to a lower level of employment as K falls.
In the long run firms can adjust both factors of production. The
desired stock of capital follows from the first order condition for profit
maximization with respect to K:
K - ~ (1-~) R
(6)
where R denotes the real user cost of capital, which are assumed constent
throughout the analysis. Equation (6) may be applied to derive an investment
function based on costs of adjustment ( e.g. Brechling, 1975). The capítal8
stock then gradually adapts to its deaired level (Kd) given by equation (6).
Investment (K - át) is equal to:
1C - W(Kd-K) - 1R~ E nl [K]~K - YK (7)
where the parameter w depends on the cost of adjustment. In the long run we
have K-Kd provided the system is stable. The investment function is intro-
duced for the purpose of comparison with the corresponding investment equa-
tion in the Keynesian model. The dynamics of the neoclassical model are not
relevant for our purpose. However, the long-run solution of the equilibrium
(un)employment rate is of central importance for our topic, i.e. the per-
sistence of unemployment in Europe.
Substitution of equations (2) and (6) in equation (1) yields the fac-
tor price frontier (FPF) of the present model:
1 ~R1-a - ntl
e~~(1-a)1-a D (8)
Combining the wage-offer curve (4) with the FPF (8) results in the long-run
equilibrium employment rate:4)
1
L - ~4~H1-~ ~-
(nil)ea~(1-a)1-a va
(9)
Following Blanchard (1988) the short-run and long-run solutions are
illustrated graphically. In Figure 1 the curve S represents the wage-offer
curve, equation (4), which could be conceived as a labour supply curve. The
short-run labour demand curve Dsr follows from equation (3). In the long run
labour demend is perfectly elastic as appears from equation (8). The corres-
ponding long-run labour demand curve is indicated by D~r in Figure 1. Star-
ting from a long-run equilibrium (point A) an increase in one of the push
factors shifts the supply curve to the left (S'). In the short run the real
wage rate rises and firms reduce labour demand. Profitability falls along
with labour employed. Therefore, capital is adjusted downward and labour
demand falls even further. As a consequence the real wage declines and the9
new long-run equilibrium is attained et point S. Meanwhile the short-run
demand curve has shifted from Dsr to Dsr. The result depends of course on
the assumption of a fixed interest rate, which determines the user cost of
capital R. As appears from the factor price frontier, equation (8), the




The discussion on the neoclassical model with real-wage rigidity
reveals a number of important points:
s) Monopolistic competition and perfect competition lead to qualitatively
the same results. In the latter case we have n- a and the profit term ~
R
in the formulas presented above venishea.
b) Aggregate demand has no role to pley whatsoever. The amount of money may
determine the absolute price level, but this is immateriel to the present
analysis and is therefore omitted.
c) Investment (capital accumulation) is entirely driven by relative factor
scarclty. Capital and labour are complementary factors of production. A fall
in labour employed leads to a decline in the profitability of capital. With
the real user cost of capital fixed, capital will then be decumulated.10
A Keynesian model
The centrel assumption of our Keynesian type of model is that (nomi-
nal) output prices and (nominal) wages are fixed in the short run. As a
consequence it becomes necessary to distinguish between demand or actual
output (X) and potential output or notional supply (Y) on the one hand and
between actual employment (N) and notional labour demand or the availability
of jobs (L) on the other hand, although these concepts are given a somewhat
different content than in the standard literature on rationing (e.g. Malin-
vaud, 1977; Benassy, 1982). Firms expect to be in a situation of "Keynesian
unemployment" most of the time. The possibility of "Repressed inflation" is
not excluded, but may be less relevant as prices adjust fast in such a
situation. With demand constrained in this way short-run profit maximisation
is not an issue, but it may pay to produce at minimal costs. Suppose, that
the production function relating notional output to notional labour demand
and capital is given by equation (1). The first-order condition for a cost
minimum can then be written as:
K 1-a W
L - X R (1C)
It should be stressed that cost minimisation according to equation (10) is a
long-run concern of firms. Factor substitution is considered for a situation
where demand equals potential output (X-Y). In such an equilibrium situation
firms want to produce at the lowest cost given factor remunerations. Cost
minimisation therefore constitutes an element of strategic behaviour in the
arrangements firms have to make.




where the parameter A is determined by monetary factors (i.e. the supply of
money and the velocity of circulation). As capital is given in the short run
firms will produce output (effective demand) with the minimal amount of





1'he output gap is closed over time by two simultaneously operating
mechanisms. First, it is assumed along traditional lines that pricea decrea-
se as a function of the rate of capacity utilization (Q - X~Y):6j
p - A(Q-1) P (13)




Such an investment equation may seem restrictive but it is ínstructive to
compare this relation with its neoclassical counterpart. For the case of
perfect competitíon the neoclassical investment function (7) can be written
as:
K- W[ 1R~ e I K1 ~- 1JK
Substitution of equations (1) and (10) into equation (14) taking account of
the definition of Q yields the Keynesien investment function:
K-~ fKP s [ la~ R]~- 1J
K
The real user cost of capital is negatively related to investment in both
equations. Changes in the real wage rate have a different effect. In the
neoclassical model a rise in real wages leads to a fall in employment (L)
and a decline in investment, whereas in the Keynesian model an increase in
real wages pushes capital deepening. In the Keynesian model it is assumed
that firms make their investment decision conditioned on a given level of12
output. The theory of investment has to fit in the effective demand frame-
work (cf. Hall and Taylor, 1988). In the neoclassical theory there is no
demand constraint and profitable investment projects may led to an expansion
in output.
From a neoclassical perspective the present Keynesian model may per-
haps seem ad-hoc. The relevant question is, however, whether the model has
something to say about a world where uncertainty prevails, information may
be asymmetrical distributed and competition takes different forms, which
calls for stategic behaviour. If this is indeed the real world a model like
the present one may be useful as a first step for understanding such a
world. This does not imply that we should abandon the rationality postulate,
which is at the heart of our science. But the assumption of representative
agents with full information may stretch the postulate too far. Anyhow, as
shown by Malinvaud (1980, 1989) and Kuipers (1988) investment functions
which give the rate of capacity utilization a role to play can be derived
from profit maximisation under uncertainty with respect to demand.~) Here we
want to emphasize that a lack of effective demand may force firms to rc~duce
their production capabilities or to close down in case of bankruptcy. Hudson
(1988) provides empirical evidence of the association between company failu-
res and the business cycle. It ahould be noted that bankrupties are not
possible in the neoclassical model in which the Modigliani-Miller theorem
holds. However, the real world seems more like a model which allows for
equity rationing as discussed in Greenwald and Stiglitz (1987, 1988). In
this model wíth circulating capital firms go bankrupt if what they promise
to pay exceeds their income from producing commodities. With fixed capital
it is optimal to liquidate an insolvent firm if the liquidation value ex-
ceeds expected net discounted revenue, adjusted to exclude any revenue in
excess of current debts (Hudson, 1988).
Turning to the labour market we assume that unions set real wages with
the intention not to endanger the existing employment opportunities. Because
unions are uncertain about the effect of their policy the actual wage rate
is adjusted to the target real wage rate with some delay. If in the meantimr~
there turns out to be unemployment real wages are moderated accordingly.






where 4 denotes the target real wage rate, which differs from its neoclassi-
cnl counterpart given in equation (4). It should be noted that the target
real wage rate will not be attained here in the long run unless ~-0. For W-0
equation (15) yields:
S2-Wl - ~ NS N
[WJ - B NS J
The gap between W and Q may reflect a change in union preferences under the
influence of actual developments in the labour market. The idea that wage
aspirations may change over time is discussed in Alogoskoufis and Manning
(1988) from a somewhat different angle.
The model has three state variables, i.e. K, P and W. Performing the
appropriate substitutions the dynamic syatem can be summarised by the fol-
lowing three equations:
K-aA 1 1-aW~-~K
P e [ a R]
P - sA 1 1-aW~-~P











The implications of the model may be sketched by discuasing the effects of a
demand shock. A more formal analysia will be presented in the next section.
Suppose that there is a long-run equilibrium initislly. The long-run equili-
brium is attained at point F on the Isoquant I~ in Figure 2. The labour mar-
ket is in equilibrium, N-Na, so that the real wage rate equals its aspira-
tion level (4). A decline in the parameter A shifts the isoquant downward to
I1. On impact of the shock firms operate at point G, laying off all thei4
labour they do not need to produce the reduced level of output. 'I'he dynnmicx
of the model induces a movement as shown by the arrow starting from point G.
Excess capacity forces firms to lower prices, while ín the meantime some
firms may have to close down because they become insolvent. Real wages fall
as there is an excess supply of labour and aspirations cannot longer be
realized. In the long run the economy might settle at a new steady state
K
tg rr - 52~R
Fi re 2
equilibrium, indicated by point H on the isoquant I2 in Figure 2. Unemploy-
ment appears to be an equilibrium phenomenon resulting from a negative
aggregate demand shock. There could of course be full employment if - given
sufficient substitution possibilities - real wages decline with the right
amount. Setting 6-0 in equation (16c) would do the job. However, such an ob-
servation is a bit triviel. The point is that the loss of capital on impact
of a negative demand pull makes everybody poorer. Workers are moderating
their wage claims compared with the initíal position (W~4), but there may be
barriers to their resilience. Unions may think that the government could do
something to alleviate the problem by increasing demand or if that route is
somehow blocked by implementing policies to retain production capacity (e.g.
Hudson, 1988).
It should be noted that the model exhibits hysteresis. To make this
more lucid let us assume for the time being that W is constant and consider15
the dynamics implied by equations (16a) and ( 16b). As appears from these
equations the two loci K-0 and P-0 are identical and equal:
1 1-~ W A 1
K-Ae [~ H, P
The corresponding phase diagram is given in Figure j. Inspection of the dif-
ferential equations shows that the system is stable, but the long-run
equilibrium depends on the initisl position of both variables. The implica-
tions of hysteresis for employment and unemployment in the long run will be
discussed in the next aection. In this section the log-linear version of the
model will be used to present a formal solution of the dynamic system.
K . .
K-P-O
Fi i re 3
3. Hysteresis and umemployment in the Keynesian model
The model given in equations (1) and (10)-(15) can easily be trans-
formed into its log-linear equivalent. The logaríthm of a variable is deno-
ted by a small letter. Coefficients are evaluated at an initiel steady state
with N-Ns and W-4. Ignoring irrelevant constants (including the user cost of
capital) the linearized model is given by:16
k- a[a - k - P t~w]
P -S[a-k-P t aw]
w- g(~ - w) t~Ca -(1-a)k - P] - ëns
Y - k - ~w
.C-k-w







x - a - P (17g)
It is convenient to rewrite the dynamic system in matríx form:
L W J -~-ï(1-~)~~ -ë~a -g J[ w J} L ó~~ 6-o J L nsJ (18)
Determination oF the characteristic equation of the state matrix on the RHS
of (18) yields:
a3 .[atgtg]a2 { [(~tP)g t à'(a(1-a) i S)]6 - ~
The roots of the system are therefore equal to:
01-0
o --(aiRtB) `- ~ (atl~t8)2 - 4f(~4S)8 4 x(a(1-a) a R)1 ~ 0 2.3 2
The model has a zero root, reflecting hysteresis implied by equations (17a)
and (17b) and two negative roots, which are stabilizing. T'he dynamic system
(18) can be simplified by noting that the first two differential ec~uations17
generate a fixed ratio between k and p as a result of a shock in the ex-
ogenous variables. This can best be seen by considering a demand shock. A
change in the exogenous variable a leada on impact to a change in k~p of
magnitude a~s. The dynamic process following such a shock conserves the
k oc
ratio p- S as appears upon inspection of the state matrix. Therefore, one
of the first two differential equations can be replaced by the equation8)
- ~ P - ~ k (19)
Elimination of equation (l~b) and substitution of (19) gives a reduced
dynamic system in the capital stock and real wages:
LwJ -~-~(l~~~a) gJ LwJ } L~ g yJ lnsJ (20)
As can be easily checked the roota of the state matrix on the RHS of (20)
are equal to 02 and o3 given above. As a result the dynamic system presented
in (20) is stable. The rest point may be a stable node or the focus of a
spiral, if the roots are conjugate complex. This reault corresponds in a
quslitatively senae with the outcome of the dynamic neoclassical model of
Bruno and Sachs (1985, chapter 3). The long-run or ateady state solution im-
plying k-w-0 can be found from:
L ww J--l
-~Íl~~iá) a8 J
-1 I~ 9 -Y J L
nsJ
Solving equations (21) yields:
kw ' ~[(X'3)a t a(9w - éns)~




where the determinant of the state matrix ~-(octp)9 t r(a(1-a) . p) is
positive. From equations (19) and (22e) the long-run solution of p can be
determined as:18
P` - ~[(J'g)s t J~(3w - Yns))
in
The solutions for the other endogenous variables can now be found by sub-
stituting (22 a, b and c) in (1~ d, e, f and g). The results are:
Y~ - x~ - ~[a((1-a)y f 8)a - PA(gw - Yns)~
ons:
n. - ~[a8a -((1-a)a r g)(gw - yns)~
The long-run solutions give rise to a number of interesting observati-
a) A decline in the exogenous variable a(a negative demand shock) leads Lo
a reduction in the stock of cepital and a reduction in prices depending on
the relative size of the relevant speed of adjustment. This is most clearly
~
seen in the special case y-0 and thus w-0 (no Phillips-curve eff'ect). We
w a ~
then have k-at~ a and p-a ~ a. A relatively high value of the "accelera-
tor", a, compared with the measure of price flexibility, p, leads to a
relatively large capital decumulation while prices are much less affected.
This looks plausible. If prices do not adjust fast profitability will not be
restored quickly and a larger number of firms will face bankruptcy. In the
case of price rigidity ~-0 there is a one for one correspondence between the
demand shock and the decline in the capital stock. If prices are fully
flexible ~~a the capital stock does not change at all and there is now an
exact correspondence between a demand shock and the resulting price level.
b) A negative demand shock gives rise to unemployment unless 8-0. In the





jobs avaílable .~ ).
c) A
duces
9)0 lead to a smaller
.
wages and a decline in employment n(and the number of
negative supply shock (i.e. an increase in w or a decrease in ns) in-
e rise in real wages. The long-run demand curve for labour has
therefore a negative slope in contrast with the neoclassical model where the
curve is horizontal as shown in Figure 1. Rising real wages go along with an
increase in the capital stock and a fall in employment. The fall in employ-
ment is caused by substitution of labour for capital and also by a reduction
of
In




contrast, positive wage aspirations19
in output. Such a reduction in output is necessary to maintain the profita-
bility of production as the cost of one factor of production (i.e. labour)
increases. From a policy point of view it is interesting to note that a
decline in employment in case of a negative supply shock can be prevented by
a positive demand shock of sufficient strength. However, there may be a
caveat here. From the mathematical point of view the model can be applied
symroetrically. Positive and negative shocks exhibit the same quantitative
ef'fects in absolute terms. In reality apeeds of adjustment may differ in
both situations. In severe recessions a may be relatively large, whereas in
booms ~ may be relatively large. Bankruptcies lead to selling out assets end
an immediate loss of firm- or industry-specific physical capital. In con-
trast investment in new capacity may take more time as sometimes suggested
in the cost of adjustment literature.
d) Ant.i-cyclical economic policy may not only take the form of stabilizing
demand but may also be aimed at a reduction of the parameter a. Retaíning
supply side capacity is the main theme of Hudson (1988) in his thought-
provoking contribution to the theory of the trade cycle. Whether this is a
Feasible policy remaina to be seen as it requires empirical evidence which
is not readily available.
It may be instructive to conclude this section with a numerical ex-
ample showing the development of the main variables over time. The parameter
values applied in the aimulations are presented in Table 2. Exemple I re-
lates to the case of real wage rigidity: unions stick to the target real wa-
ge rate. In example II the Phillips-curve mechanism generates full employ-
ment in the long run. Case III gives the intermediate position with some
learning on the side of unions.
The time paths9) of the capital, real wages and employment for each
set of parameters in the case of a negative demand shock of 5x (a ~-5) are
given in Figure 4. Under real wage rigidity (Ex. I) employment falls sub-
stantially on impact of the shock, but recovers as prices decline and demand
is positively affected. At the same time the stock of capítal decreases,
which has a negative effect on employment. A new equilibrium is attained
when both effects cancel each other. As appears from Figure 4 the new long-
run equilibrium is approximated closely after 20 periods (not to be inter-
preted as years). The working of the Phillips curve induces a fall in real
wages and substitution of capital for labour (Ex. II). As a consequence the20
stock of capital is reduced even further than in the previous case. Full
employment is restored eventually, but the system exhibits cyclical be-
haviour (there are complex roots in this case). The real wage undershoots
its long-run equilibrium value, because the parameter y is relatively high.
Whether such a value is realistic or not is of course an empirical question.
But the example illustrates that the real wage rate moves procyclical in our
Keynesian model, which corresponds with empirical observations.10) The
results in the intermediate case (Ex. III) lie neatly between the two other
cases. Wage aspirations dampen the cycle, but also prevent the return to a
situation of full employment in the long run. For both runs with ~)0 the
real wage rate never recaptures its original value. This is the price to be
paid for hysteresis, which takes the form of a permanent loss in the stock
of capital.
Table 2


































i0 10 N1 ~0 50
-~i






As indicated in the first section, empirical evidence gives support to
a capital shortage interpretation of European unemployment, which during the
recessions of 19~4-1975 and 1980-1982 has increased by two substantial.
jumps. This paper has sought to explore how capital decumulation might arise
as a consequence of severe negative demand shocks. The neoclassical model
does not predict such a relationship, even not when monopolistic competition
is taken into account. To cope with the problem we have therefore to resort
to the assumption that the market for commodities exhibits price inertia. In
such a Keynesian model quantity adjustments (of output and capacity) are of
central importance.
The labour market is modelled by assuming that unions set real wages
with the intention not to endanger the existing employment opportunities.
In the long run there may be a gap between the actusl and the target real
wage rate reflecting a change in union preferences under the influence oF
actunl developments in the labour market.
The implications oF the model are sketched by discussing the ef'Fects
of a negative demand shock. The model exhibits hysteresis: a demand shock
leads to a reduction in the stock of capital, which is not restored by the
reduction in prices unless in the limiting (and unrealistic) case that
prices are assumed to be fully flexible. As a result, a negative demand
shock gives rise to unemployment, unless the Phillips-curve can do its job.
If so, full employment may be possible, but capital and output cannot return
to their initial positions.
The present analysis can be extended in different directions. Insider
effects and outsider effects (cf. Layard and Bean, 1988) may provide forms
of hysteresis, which can be combined with state dependency of the capital
stock. Moreover, the idea of fragile equilibria (cf. Summers, 1988) may be
fruitful in analysing firm behaviour along the lines set in this paper.23
Notes
') We are indebted to F. ven der Plceg for useful comment on a first draft
of the paper.
1) In European countries the ratio between investment and output has decrea-
sed in a considerable amount. The following figures show that after the
recovery in i984 investment ratios only slowly recover:
Investment ratios (EEC, Percentage changes)
1973 -0.4 1976 -2.1 1979 0.2 1982 -2.9 1985 0.1
1974 -4.0 1977 - 1.8 1980 0.6 1983 -1.4 1986 0.8
1975 -5.1 1978 -0.7 1981 -5.2 1984 -0.8 1987 1.4
Source: OECD, 1988, Table R5 (Volume of gross fíxed capital formation) and
Table R1 (Real GNP).
2) As shown among others in Blanchard and Kiyotaki (1987) end Van de Klun-
dert and Peters (1988) demand for the product of firm i can be written as:
P
Yi - n 1 , ~,~ 1
P
where n is the number of firms in the economy end P is an average price
index. It appears that firm demand depends upon aggregate demand Y. However,
in a neoclassical model with flexible prices aggregate demand equals ag-
gregate supply.
3) There are other interpretationa posaible of equation ( 4) (e.g. Layard and
Nickell, 1986), but in a European context there should be at least some role
for unions to play.
n
4) Burda (1988) presents a dynamic version of this model based on the fami-
liar q-theory of investment.24
5) Equation (12) follows from ex-post profit maximisation supposing that
(bx~bN)~w (cf. Malinvaud, i989).
6) A possible effect of nominal wage changes on nominal price setting is not
teken into account, because we ignore the leap-frogging of prices over wages
and vice versa.
7) Malinvaud (i989) derives two conditions for (ex-ante) profit maximisa-
tion: (1) the capital cost of a unit of capacity must exactly be covered by
the expected value of the (marginal) gross profit; (2) the (ex-ante) mar-
ginal rate of substitution between capital and labour, corrected for the
expected rate of capacity utilization, should be equal to the factor price
ratio. These two conditions determine the desired capital stock. An invest-
ment equation could be derived in the usual way by assuming that the actual
capital stock gradually adjusts towards its desired level.
8) This procedure of "eliminating the zero root" can be generalised as zero
roots reflect dependency of rows and columns in the state matrix. Now, the
system of equations Ax - b, where the matrix A is of order n x n and of rank
r, has a solution if the augmented matrix B-[A:b] is also of rank r. The
solution is obtained from r equations and the remaining (n-r) equations can
be ignored as derivable From them. The latter can be called "surplus" equa-
tions (e.g. Allen, 1956). The solution expresses r variables in terms of the
(n-r) "surplus" variables. Substitution of the solution in the original sys-
tem gives a reduced system with a singular matrix. Application to a system
of differential equations yields a state matrix with non-zero roots, which
can be handled in the ususl way.
9) The roots are:
Ex. I: vl - o, a2 - o. 03 --0.1875
Ex. II: al - 0, a2 3--0.1875 i i 2.125 -(0.1875)225
E~c. III: al - 0, a2, --0.3125 4 i` 2.21875 -(0.~125)2
3
The characteristic equation of the state matrix on the RHS of (20) can be
written as: aZ.bla.b2-0. It appears that bl)0, b2)0 and bl-4b2(0, so that
the examples II and III exhibit oscillating and damped behaviour.
10) Procyclical real wages, which have been frequently observed are in con-
tradiction with the results of the textbook Keynesian model based on nominal
wage rigidity (cf. Stevenson, et. al., 1988). However, for a different view
on the empirical pattern of real wages see Newell and Symons (1988).26
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